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Sovereign Immunity - An Argument Pro
Robert F. Howartb, Jr.*
f HE OHIO DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY vis-a-vis the United
States Constitution, fourteenth amendment, will hereinafter
be considered. Before delving into the constitutional realities, how-
ever, the substance of this narrow discussion should be placed in
perspective with the multifarious civil actions arising out of the
Kent State tragedy, May 4, 1970.
In all, twenty-two civil lawsuits have been commenced against
a motley group of parties-defendants with aggregate prayers totalling
in excess of $99,300,000. Summarily, these actions have been posited
in both federal and state forums, and predicated upon the following
theories:
1. Federal civil rights actions (Title 42 U.S.C., § 1983; Title
28 U.S.C., §§ 1331, 1343) designating various agents of the State of
Ohio as parties-defendants.
2. Federal wrongful death and personal injury actions (Title
28 U.S.C. § 1332) designating various agents of the State of Ohio
as parties-defendants.
3. Ohio state court wrongful death and personal injury actions
designating various agents of Ohio as parties-defendants.
4. Ohio state court wrongful death and personal injury actions
designating the State of Ohio as the sole party-defendant.
The lawsuits falling within the first, second and third categories
defined above are not, at this time, finally resolved and, therefore,
the writer has deemed it inappropriate to comment thereon. On
December 11, 1972, however, the United States Supreme Court
determined that the appeal from Krause v. Ohio,' lacked a sub-
stantial federal question, making proper the following comments
relative to the constitutional issues involved in the fourth group of
actions above defined.
On July 19, 1972, the Ohio Supreme Court held in Krause that
the State of Ohio could not be sued in tort pursuant to the court's
interpretation of the Ohio Constitution, article I, section 16, as
amended September 3, 1912. Furthermore, the Ohio Supreme Court
concluded that article I, section 16, was not violative of the United
States Constitution, fourteenth amendment.
B.A., Dennison University; J.D., Ohio State University; Special Counsel to the Attorney
General, Charles E. Brown, of the State of Ohio in Krause v. Ohio,
131 Ohio St.2d 132 (1972).
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Thereafter, Mr. Krause appealed this decision to the United
States Supreme Court2 arguing in his jurisdictional statement that
the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusions violated his fourteenth amend-
ment rights to both due process of law and equal protection under
the laws. Responding thereto, the State of Ohio submitted a motion
to dismiss the appeal arguing, among other things, that the appeal
was devoid of merit and precluded by earlier decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. Although the writer's schedule does not per-
mit an all-inclusive review of the various and far-reaching constitu-
tional aspects and ramifications of the Ohio doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the following is the pertinent portion of the State of Ohio's
motion to dismiss the appeal.
1. Due Process
Inherent to the due process of law concept in our coun-
try's jurisprudence is the well-settled and fundamental rule
that a state cannot be sued without its consent. This reality
is documented at the genesis of our Constitution in the de-
bates of the Virginia Convention, convened to ratify the
new document. For example, John Marshall, debating Section
2, Article III, stated:
"It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power
should be dragged before a court . . . But, say they,
there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be a
defendant-if an individual cannot proceed to obtain
a judgment against a state, though he may be sued by
a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided.
I see a difficulty in making a State defendant, which
does not prevent its being plaintiff." J. ELLIOT, ELLIOT
DEBATES 555 (1876)
Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment, constitutionalizing
this basic precept relative to the federal courts, came in the
wake of shock and surprise caused by this Court's decision
in Chiskolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). De-
scribing the sequence of events following Chisholm, the
Court wrote in Hans v. State of Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1890) :
"Chisholm v. Georgia [holding that a state was liable to
suit by a citizen under the Constitution as originally
drawn] . . .created such a shock of surprise through-
out the country that, at the first meeting of Congress
2 Krause v. Ohio, 28 Ohio App.2d 1, 274 N.E.2d 321 (1971); rev'd., 31 Ohio St.2d 132,
285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), appeal dismissed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No.
22), petition for rebearing dismissed, -.- --- U.S . .- , Jan. 22, 1973.
1973)
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thereafter, the 11th Amendment to the Constitution
was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due
course adopted by the legislatures of the states."
This Court has, on numerous occasions, affirmed this
inherent proposition. Speaking for the Court in Beers v.
Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857), Chief Justice
Taney stated at page 529:
"It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all
civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in
its own courts . . . without its consent or permission."
See "Note," commencing at 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527
This basic principle has remained viable throughout our
country's jurisprudence, See, e.g., Langford v. United States,
101 U.S. 341 (1880) ; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) ;
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907); In the
Matter of the State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1920);
Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933) ; Monaco v. Missis-
sippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) ; Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) ; Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963) ; Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963) ; Parden v.
Terminal R. of Alcbama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
Although these exemplary cases involved the immunity of
the United States and the immunity of the states to federal
suit, the underlying precept is consistent; to-wit, a sovereign
entity cannot be sued without the sovereign's consent.
Likewise, an overwhelming majority of the states in this
country continue to recognize the viability of this basic
precept. It is important to emphasize that the states have
not retained the fundamental rule solely due to the tradi-
tional concepts of sovereignty but rather, as a consequence
of the venerable rationale upon which it is founded. The
tenet has been inherent in all notions of due process since
the inception of our country.
Ignoring this heritage, appellant would assert that the
Supreme Court of Ohio's non-self-executing interpretation
of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution violates his
rights to due process of law guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment. This appeal is not
novel and this Court has previously ruled on the identical
issue.
Shortly after the people of Ohio amended Section 16,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court
ruled, in an analogous case sounding in tort, that the new
(Vol. 22:48
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amendment was not self-executing. Specifically, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held in Raudabaugh v. The State of Ohio;
Palmer v. The State of Ohio, 96 Ohio St. 513 (1917) syllabus
paragraphs one and two:
"1. A state is not subject to suit in its own courts with-
out its express consent.
"2. The provisions of the Ohio Constitution, article I,
section 16, as amended September 3, 1912, that, 'Suits
may be brought against the state, in such courts and
in such manner, as may be provided by law' is not self-
executing; and statutory authority is required as a pre-
requisite to the bringing of suits against the state."
The decision was thereafter appealed to this Court on
the issue of whether it violated plaintiffs' rights to due
process of laws guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
Determining that plaintiffs' rights to due process were not
violated, the United States Supreme Court held in Palmer
v. The State of Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 33 (1918) :
"The right of individuals to sue a state, in either a fed-
eral or a state court, cannot be derived from the Consti-
tution, or laws of the United States. It can come only
from the consent of the state. Beers v. Arkansas. 20
How. 527; Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337; Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1. Whether Ohio gave the required
consent must be determined by the construction to be
given to the constitutional amendment quoted, and this
is a question of local state law, as to which the decision
of the State Supreme Court is controlling with this
court, no federal right being involved. Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, 159; Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 116; Memphis Street. Ry. Co. v.
Moore, 243 U.S. 299, 301" (Emphasis added)
From the foregoing, it is clear that any proper due
process question which appellant might have raised is devoid
of merit and foreclosed by earlier decisions of this Court.
2. Equal Protection
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, is not, on
its face, discriminatory. No person may sue the State of
Ohio without legislative consent. Appellant has not estab-
lished an inceptive classification, much less a suspect classi-
fication, nor argued that any duty exists upon the Ohio
legislature to provide an Ohio court jurisdiction over his
19731
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cause of action. Therefore, any discussion of equal protec-
tion is foreign to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, should this Court determine that Section
16 of Article I does create a classification, that classification
is reasonable and does not offend appellant's constitutional
rights. Graham v. Richardson. 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ; Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 491 (1970) ; McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). While one of the most compell-
ing and critical aspects for not granting a court jurisdiction
over the state is the necessity of protecting the state from
an astronomical invasion of its treasury, the policy also
enables the state government to function unhampered by
the threat of time and energy consuming legal actions
which would appreciably inhibit the rigorous and effective
administration of traditional state activities. Additionally,
it affords that degree of protection demanded by the numer-
ous administrative and high-risk activities undertaken by
the state government; activities unknown to private enter-
prise (e.g. maintaining a highway system, penal institu-
tions, mental hospitals, providing police and fire protection,
etcetera). Clearly, these circumstances establish more than
a reasonable basis for leaving to legislative determination
the instances when the state shall be subject to suit. Ac-
cordingly, a view of this Court's ruling that, "a statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it," (McGowan v.
Maryland, supra) Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Consti-
tution, does not violate appellant's right to the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Appellant urges, however, that the right to judicial
redress is fundamental as the concept is employed by this
Court in Shapiro va. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). There-
fore, he concludes appellee's burden is increased and the
State of Ohio must demonstrate a compelling state interest,
as opposed to the traditional reasonable basis.
Initially, it must be noted that the right to judicial
redress has never been held fundamental vis-a-vis the
Shapiro doctrine, thus demanding the demonstration of a
compelling state interest. Additionally, as appellee has demon-
strated, the state's interests involved herein are not limited
to fiscal integrity as in Shapiro but permeate the vital
functions of state government.
Assuming, arguendo, the right to judicial redress is of a
fundamental character, even the most fundamental of rights
('Vol. 22 :48
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is not absolute but is circumscribed with exception. For
instance, this Court has recently held that malicious libel
enjoys no First Amendment protection [Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)], and that ob-
scenity is not within the area of protected speech or press
[Ginsberg 'v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1969), Teh. denied
391 U.S. 971 (1968)]. Further, as Mr. Justice Harlan
points out in his dissent to Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
at 661, such fundamental rights as the right to pursue a
particular occupation [Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955) ; Katch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1947)], the right to receive wages for one's
labors [Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917)], and the
right to inherit property [Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373
(1915) ] are adjudged under the traditional equal protection
standard.
Very recently, this Court, considering the identical
fundamental right that was involved in Shapiro (interstate
travel), held the state need only show a rational basis to
constitutionally justify a commercial airline passenger tax
[Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines, . ----- U.S -..... , 31
L. Ed. 2d 620 (1972)]. And in another recent decision, this
Court indicated that even the basic democratic right to vote
was not an absolute [Dunn v. Blumstein ....... U.S ........ 31
L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972)].
As with these fundamental rights, the right to judicial
redress is tempered by a most important exception, crucial
to this appeal. Specifically, the right to judicial redress
against a state can only be effectuated if the state consents
to suit. As previously demonstrated (II1. ARGUMENT,
Part C, 1, See pp. 10-13, supra), a venerable exception our
country's notion of due process is that a state may not be
sued without its consent.
This limitation on the right to judicial redress was spe-
cifically affirmed in Palmer v. The State of Ohio, 248 U.S. at
33, where this Court held:
"The right of individuals to sue a state, in either a fed-
eral or state court, cannot be derived from the Consti-
tution, or laws of the United States. it can come only
from the consent of the state." (omitting citations)
Consequently, if access to the courts is a fundamental right,
that right has been circumscribed by this limitation since
the origin of our nation's Constitution.
1973]
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Further, there is no substantive distinction to be drawn
between the Ohio situation in question and the immunity of
the federal government to suit. Would appellant argue that
the immunity of the United States as applied by this Court
violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution? Or, indeed, would appellant argue that the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution is in some
manner offensive to the Constitution to which it is amended?
These questions are posited to demonstrate the quagmire
upon which appellant's contentions rest.
Earlier this year, this Court considered, on the merits,
an appeal raising the identical equal protection issue pres-
ently at bar. The case of Carolyne v. Youngstown, 404 U.S.
1007 (1972), presented the question:
"Does Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, by
failing to provide for suits sounding in tort against the
state or its agents violate the Equal Protection Clause?"
40 U.S.L.W. 3271 (1971).
The appeal was dismissed.
It is respectfully submitted that the only questions which
could conceivably be raised by appellant are devoid of merit
and precluded by earlier decisions of this Court. Axiomat-
ically, the appeal must be dismissed. Zucht v. King, 260
U.S. 174 (1922) ; Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182
(1919) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brown, 187
U.S. 308 (1902).
In light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling on the
merits, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is today viable and re-
mains within the discretion of the sovereign -the people of the
several States. Although sophisticated fourteenth amendment at-
tacks can and have been waged against this reality, the orderly
administration of law in our country demands that the integrity of
the majority be honored.
[Vol. 22 :48
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
